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ABSTRACT
Cryptocurrencies have taken the world by storm. But these decentralized and
unregulated digital fiat currencies have more in common with the currencies of ages
past than many believe. These commonalities may result in the incorporation of new
cryptocurrencies into older institutions. One such institution is the International
Monetary Fund’s Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), which has been relegated to an
afterthought in the international monetary system since the Nixon Shock in 1971.
The Fund’s Managing Director recently made comments that indicated that the Fund
is exploring the incorporation of a cryptocurrency into the framework of the SDR, a
change which China and other emerging economies are bound to encourage because
it would likely move the international monetary system away from the use of the
powerful U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. Because the U.S. dollar remains the
most important currency within the international monetary system, this Article first
explores the legal status of U.S. currency and the creation of Bretton Woods after
World War II and its implosion after the Nixon Shock. It then discusses the basic
* Washington D.C.-based attorney.
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functions of SDRs and their past uses. Finally, this Article explores two options that
the Fund may have in incorporating cryptocurrencies into SDRs: (1) redefining the
SDR as its own unique cryptocurrency; and (2) incorporating a specific
cryptocurrency within the SDR’s basket of currencies.

INTRODUCTION
Una fides, pondus, mensura, moneta sit una,
Et status illæsus totius orbis erit.
– Budelius1
Great societal unrest—fueled by the declining influence of corrupt and powerful
institutions—can lead a disheartened and disillusioned people to look to a new
monetary system based strictly on objective principles and removed from corruption
and the whims of man. Today, this new monetary system might be a decentralized
cryptocurrency, based on blockchain technology.2 But during the Protestant
Reformation, popular sentiment turned to a different kind of “world money.”3
Gasparo Scaruffi, the Italian economist, proposed a universal money system
based on strict, scientific principles, with a silver-to-gold ratio of 12:1.4 In his
system, money was to be uniform among all nations.5 He called this system moneta
immaginaria, or the imaginary coin, because it was merely a money-of-account.6
But Scaruffi’s patrons and contemporaries never adopted his idea. The moneta
immaginaria concept, though, did not fade. Vauban—adviser to the Sun King, Louis
XIV—promoted the use of physical world coins, based on a universal monetary
system, in 1690.7 And it was the Napoleonic desire for world money that resulted
in the creation of the Latin Monetary Union, the nineteenth-century attempt to adopt
a universal coinage with an agreed-upon gold content.8 Immediately after World
War II, however, the renowned law professor Arthur Nussbaum of Columbia
University noted that “[w]hile international regulation of national monetary systems
has long been on its way, the notion of ‘world money’ has proved sterile.”9
But World War II also brought the wreckage of the modern international
1. ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, MONEY IN THE LAW NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY IN THE BORDERLINE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 547 (1950) (quoting BUDELIUS, DE MONETIS ET RE
NUMARIA (1591)). This phrase is often translated as, “One Faith, one Weight, one Measure, and one Coin /
Would all the world in harmony enjoin.” E.g., ROBERT PHILLIPS, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND ITS
PROBLEMS 720 (1941).
2. E.g., Teddy Wayne, Grandpa Had a Pension, This Generation Has Cryptocurrency, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug.
3,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/03/style/what-is-cryptocurrency.html
[https://perma.cc/3AJP-YCEH] (“Cryptocurrency has understandable appeal to millennials who came of age
during the 2008 financial crisis and are now watching the rise of antiglobalist populism threaten the stability
of the international economy.”).
3. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 1, at 547.
4. See id. at 548.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. NUSSBAUM, supra note 1, at 550 (citing SEBASTIEN LE PRESTRE DE VAUBAN, VAUBAN: SA
FAMILLE ET SES ECRITS (1910)).
8. See generally JOHN F. CHOWN, A HISTORY OF MONEY: FROM AD 800 83–92 (2005).
9. NUSSBAUM, supra note 1, at 552.
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economic scheme, one especially dominated by European interests. Any budding
international monetary system, therefore, would naturally be controlled by the
world’s most viable economy. This economy was undoubtedly American: The
nation’s Gross National Product rose from $88.6 billion in 1939 to $135 billion in
1944,10 whereas European economies were decimated. The International Monetary
Fund (IMF), therefore, was created and directed by American interests. The
American dollar—the backbone of the new international monetary system—became
its own kind of world money and has carried unprecedented power ever since. In
just 150 years, the U.S. dollar went from a provincial bimetallic currency to an
international quasi-gold currency.
The IMF further established the U.S. dollar as world money with the proposal
to create Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). The SDR was put forward by John
Maynard Keynes in 1944 as a supplementary international reserve asset whose value
was initially defined by a gold standard.11 The IMF adopted the system in 1969 to
“further advance toward the regulation of the international monetary system by law
and by the exercise of reason under law.”12 But after the collapse of the Bretton
Woods system in the 1970s—typically attributed to the Nixon Shock—the IMF
redefined the SDR as a basket of world currencies focused primarily on the U.S.
dollar, and it became somewhat of an afterthought in the global financial system.13
Recently, however, the IMF assembled financial experts to assess a broader role
for the SDR and its potential contribution “to the smooth functioning of the
international monetary system.”14 And causing further excitement, the Managing
Director of the IMF noted that the SDR could have a digital future.15 James
Mackintosh of the Wall Street Journal dubbed this cryptocurrency version of the
SDR the “IMFcoin.”16 And as several powerful nations in the international
community—including and, perhaps, especially China—encourage this
development to eliminate the U.S. dollar’s status and “exorbitant privilege,”17 the
legal structure of this new cryptocurrency remains unexplored.
In Part I of this Article, I briefly discuss the history of the U.S. dollar’s legal
status—especially because it served as the basis of the Bretton Woods system and
10. ALAN S. MILWARD, WAR, ECONOMY, AND SOCIETY 1939–1945 63, 67 (1979).
11. Duncan Cameron, Special Drawing Rights, 36 INT’L J. 713, 714 (1981).
12. JOSEPH GOLD, IMF, PAMPHLET SERIES NO. 13, SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS (1969).
13. Press Release, International Monetary Fund, IMF Launches New SDR Basket Including Chinese
Renminbi, Determines New Currency Amounts (Sept. 30, 2016).
14. Press Release, International Monetary Fund, The IMF Launches Consultations on the Role of the
Special Drawing Right with External Advisory Group (Oct. 31, 2016).
15. Christine Lagarde, Managing Dir., IMF, Central Banking and Fintech—A Brave New World?,
Address
Before
the
Bank
of
England
Conference
(Sept.
29,
2017),
http://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2017/09/28/sp092917-central-banking-and-fintech-a-brave-newworld [https://perma.cc/9A47-Z9YY].
16. James Mackintosh, Forget Bitcoin, Have You Heard of IMFcoin?, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 5, 2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/forget-bitcoin-have-you-heard-of-imfcoin-1507228382
[https://perma.cc/2DL9-PR2H].
17. See BARRY EICHENGREEN, EXORBITANT PRIVILEGE: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE DOLLAR AND
THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 4 (2011) (“This has long been a sore point for
foreigners, . . . Charles de Gaulle made the issue a cause célèbre in a series of presidential press conferences
in the 1960s. His finance minister, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, referred to it as America’s ‘exorbitant
privilege.’”).
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an international monetary order. I also examine the Nixon Shock and the resultant
collapse of Bretton Woods.
Part II focuses specifically on the development of the SDR and its basic
functions as well as past uses. Finally, in Part III, I explore the implications of two
plausible methods of adopting a cryptocurrency version of the SDR: the redefinition
of the SDR entirely as a cryptocurrency and the incorporation of a cryptocurrency
within the current SDR basket.
I. HISTORY OF THE LEGAL STATUS OF U.S. CURRENCY
To best understand the postwar international monetary order, one must fully
comprehend money’s position as a central player in the development of the
American economy.18 Frankly, this is because that international order was largely
formed and dictated by American policy-makers and continues to be chiefly
impacted by American economic policy.
Money has always claimed an important position in American society. John
Locke noted that the unique invention of a capitalist monetary system in the West
allowed for the accumulation of property without waste.19 The American Founders
considered this accumulation and ownership of property fundamental.20 The
development of American monetary policy amply illustrates various legal regimes
of bimetallism,21 fiat currencies,22 the gold standard,23 and the quasi-gold standard.24
Ultimately, these American experiences shaped the evolution of the Bretton
Woods system.25 And these American economic policies are precisely what would
cause the demise of Bretton Woods in the 1970s.26
A. From bimetallism to the classic gold standard
1. Bimetallic currency
In 1791, Alexander Hamilton recommended a bimetallic currency at a fixed 15:1
ratio of silver-to-gold,27 despite his personal preference for a gold standard.28 And,
18. See Christine Desan, Money as a Legal Institution, in MONEY IN THE WESTERN LEGAL
TRADITION: MIDDLE AGES TO BRETTON WOODS 18, 18 (David Fox & Wolfgang Ernst eds., 2016).
19. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION 47 (J. W. Gough ed., Basil Blackwell & Mott Ltd. 1948) (1689) (“And thus came in the use of
money—some lasting thing that men might keep without spoiling, and that, by mutual consent, men would
take in exchange for the truly useful but perishable supports of life.”).
20. See, e.g., Thomas G. West, The Economic Principles of America’s Founders: Property Rights,
Free Markets, and Sound Money 9 (Heritage Found., First Principles Series No. 32, 2010).
21. See infra Part I.A.1.
22. See infra Part I.A.2.
23. See infra Part I.A.3.
24. See infra Part I.A.4.
25. See infra Part I.B.
26. See infra Part I.C.
27. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, REPORT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MINT (1791),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-07-02-0334-0004#ARHN-01-07-02-0334-0004-fn0122 [https://perma.cc/QD6F-ZWYF].
28. Alexander Hamilton’s viewpoint is outlined below:
Although [Hamilton] preferred a monometallic gold standard, he proposed a system of
bimetallism, since “to annul the use of either of the metals, as money, is to abridge the
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under its newly-enumerated constitutional powers,29 Congress adopted his
recommendation after very little debate.30 This was known as the Coinage Act of
1792,31 and it fixed the gold dollar at 24.75 grains of pure gold and the silver dollar
at 371.25 grains of pure silver.32 But the fixed ratio of 15:1 nearly precisely
corresponded to the contemporaneous market silver-to-gold ratio, and, after the
massive increase in silver production from Mexican mines during the early 1800s,
gold coins disappeared from the U.S., and silver coins suddenly dominated the
market.33
Despite the economic changes, the standard remained until the Coinage Act of
1834,34 which was notably the only Jacksonian reform measure quickly adopted by
Congress.35 Best understood in the context of Andrew Jackson’s Bank War,36 the
Act adjusted the silver-to-gold ratio from 15:1 to 16:1, making gold significantly
cheaper. This, in turn, resulted in silver’s expulsion from the country, and gold was
finally brought back into circulation.37
2. Experimentation with fiat currency
The first form of American fiat currency would soon flourish.38 The U.S.
government, under financial pressures from the Civil War, began to issue treasury
notes.39 Convertibility of those notes, however, proved to be a concern.40 So for the
first time, in 1862, the government issued non-convertible legal tender to the amount
of $150 million.41 The value of this legal tender—known as greenbacks—rose and
quantity of the circulating medium; and is liable to all the objection which arise from a
comparison of the benefits of a full, with the evils of a scanty circulation.”
See PAUL STUDENSKI & HERMAN EDWARD KROOSS, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 62 (1952).
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have power to . . . coin money, regulate the value
thereof . . . .”).
30. See ANGELA REDISH, BIMETALLISM: AN ECONOMIC AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 11 (2000).
31. Coinage Act of 1792, ch. 16, 1 Stat. 246 (1792).
32. Coinage Legislation, 9 BANKING L.J. 105, 105 (1893).
33. See RON PAUL & LEWIS LEHRMAN, THE CASE FOR GOLD 31–32 (2d ed. 2011). This monetary
principle is referred to as Gresham’s Law, which states that “bad money drives good money out of
circulation.” See generally SCOTT G. DACKO, THE ADVANCED DICTIONARY OF MARKETING: PUTTING
THEORY TO USE 243 (2008).
34. Coinage Act of 1834, ch. 95, 4 Stat. 699 (1834).
35. STEPHEN W. STATHIS, LANDMARK LEGISLATION 1774–2002 56 (2003).
36. This was the political struggle over the issue of re-chartering the Second Bank of the U.S. during
Jackson’s presidency. See generally PAUL KAHAN, THE BANK WAR: ANDREW JACKSON, NICHOLAS BIDDLE,
AND THE FIGHT FOR AMERICAN FINANCE (2016). Proponents of the Coinage Act of 1834 believed that “by
promoting the currency of gold they would strike a blow at the currency of bank notes, especially those of
the Bank of the United States.” Paul M. O’Leary, The Coinage Legislation of 1834, 45 J. POL. ECON. 80, 80
(1937).
37. JAMES S. OLSEN & ABRAHAM O. MENDOZA, AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY: A DICTIONARY
AND CHRONOLOGY 124 (2015).
38. Fiat currency is unbacked; therefore, it has no intrinsic value. See N. GREGORY MANKIW, BRIEF
PRINCIPLES OF MACROECONOMICS 222 (2015). Rather, its value is based merely on government decree. See
id.
39. CRAIG K. ELWELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41887, BRIEF HISTORY OF THE GOLD STANDARD
IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2011).
40. “The policy of guaranteeing convertibility of currency into real commodities . . . .” PATRICK
COLLINS, CURRENCY CONVERTIBILITY: THE RETURN TO SOUND MONEY 1 (1985).
41. Legal Tender Act of 1862, ch. 33, 12 Stat. 345 (1862) (“That the Secretary of the Treasury is
hereby authorized to issue, on the credit of the United States, one hundred and fifty millions of dollars of
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fell during the Civil War, often based on Union battle successes and failures.42
After the Civil War, Treasury Secretary Hugh McCulloch—fueled by concerns
that fiat currency allowed for the politicization of monetary policy—began to
withdraw the greenbacks from circulation.43 The government’s momentary
experiment with fiat currency finished when the market exchange rate of greenbacks
for gold was brought back to the antebellum level.44 Withdrawal ended in 1878:
frozen at about $347 million in circulation.45
3. The gold standard emerges
Congress officially ended bimetallism with the Coinage Act of 1873,46 which
decisively planted the nation on the gold standard. Due to a later economic crisis,
critics derided the Act as the “Crime of ’73,”47 but it appears Congress intended not
to overhaul the bimetallist system; the intention was merely to reestablish gold
convertibility and eliminate fiat currency.48 Alas, in defining the value of American
currency within the Act, Congress failed to include the silver dollar.49 The omission,
however, proved economically powerful.
The resultant demonetization of silver by the Act was probably one of the causes
of the Panic of 1873, the most severe economic recession in the U.S. until the Great
Depression.50 And once the American public became aware of these consequences,
congressional advocates of silver passed the Bland-Allison Act in 1878,51 despite a
veto by President Hayes.52 In an attempt to counteract deflation brought on by the
Panic, this Act required the U.S. Treasury to put a specified amount of silver into
circulation as silver dollars.53 But American monetary policy has never been
isolated from and unaffected by the global economy, so when world-silver prices
fell, silver once again flooded the American market, where the price of silver was
artificially high.54
United States notes, not bearing interest, payable to bearer . . . .”); JAMES LAURENCE LAUGHLIN, THE
HISTORY OF BIMETALLISM IN THE U.S. 87 (1891).
42. H. W. BRANDS, GREENBACK PLANET: HOW THE DOLLAR CONQUERED THE WORLD AND
THREATENED CIVILIZATION AS WE KNOW IT 13 (2011) (“‘Along with ordinary happenings, we fellows in
Wall Street had the fortunes of the war to speculate about,’ Daniel Drew, one of the most active speculators,
recalled. ‘That always makes great doings on a stock exchange. It’s good fishing in troubled waters.’”).
43. SAMUEL DECANIO, DEMOCRACY AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE 60
(2015).
44. ELWELL, supra note 39, at 6.
45. Id.; see also BENJAMIN J. KLEBANER, AMERICAN COMMERCIAL BANKING: A HISTORY 62 (1990)
(stating that the $347 million was left in circulation to appease agricultural interest).
46. Coinage Act of 1873, ch. 131, 17 Stat. 424 (1873).
47. E.g., Peter Porcupine, The Crime of ’73, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1896, at 5.
48. ELWELL, supra note 39, at 6.
49. Id.
50. See STEVEN P. RETI, SILVER AND GOLD: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY CONFERENCES, 1867–1892 67–68 (1998).
51. Bland-Allison Act, ch. 20, 20 Stat. 25 (1878).
52. President Rutherford B. Hayes, Remarks at the House of Representatives (Feb. 8, 1878) (transcript
available at the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia).
53. Bland-Allison Act, ch. 20, 20 Stat. 25 (1878) (“That there shall be coined, at the several mints of
the United States, silver dollars . . . [which] shall be legal tender, at their nominal value, for all debts and
dues public and private, except where otherwise expressly stipulated in the contract.”).
54. See ELWELL, supra note 39, at 7.
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The political struggle between proponents of the gold standard and proponents
of bimetallism was at a high when William Jennings Bryan delivered his famed
“Cross of Gold” speech during the presidential election of 1896.55 But despite the
populist fervor surrounding Bryan, William McKinley was the victorious
candidate,56 and, with his election, Congress passed the Gold Standard Act.57 The
Act reaffirmed governmental commitment to the gold standard, and, for the first
time, a gold reserve for paper notes was formally established.58
4. The quasi-gold standard
The gold standard remained in place during the early 1900s, but President
Franklin D. Roosevelt was moved to action by the drastic conditions of the Great
Depression and suspended gold convertibility. He signed an executive order
requiring gold-coin “hoarders” to deliver their coins to the Federal Reserve,
effectively criminalizing civilian possession of gold coins.59
Congress then passed the Gold Reserve Act in 1934.60 The Act limited gold
transactions to official settlements with other countries’ central banks and officially
outlawed private possession of any gold.61 Gold coins were withdrawn from
circulation and melted into bullion.62 So while the value of the dollar continued to
be defined in terms of gold, American citizens could no longer convert their dollars
into gold, thus creating the quasi-gold standard.63
B. Bretton Woods and an international monetary order
It was under Roosevelt’s quasi-gold standard—a gold standard without
convertibility—that the Bretton Woods system was established. After three years of
drafting by American and British officials, they planned to meet in the summer of
1944 at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire.64 It was precisely the three years of
thorough planning that caused IMF’s official historian, Margaret Garritsen de Vries,

55. William Jennings Bryan, Address to the National Democratic Convention (July 9, 1896).
56. Bryan’s supporters were typically those with agricultural interests, whereas McKinley’s
supporters were those with banking interests. E.g., QUENTIN R. SKRABEC, JR., WILLIAM MCKINLEY:
APOSTLE OF PROTECTIONISM 74 (2008) (“Most of the Republican Party stood with the Eastern bankers for
the gold standard. The gold standard tightened the money supply and this particularly hurt the farmers.
Farmers needed mortgages. The use of silver could help bring down interest rates.”).
57. Gold Standard Act, ch. 41, 31 Stat. 45 (1900).
58. ELWELL, supra note 39, at 8.
59. Exec. Order No. 6102 (1933). The Executive Order addressed the issue of hoarding:
The Executive order issued by the President yesterday amplifies and particularizes his
earlier warnings against hoarding. On March 6, taking advantage of a wartime statute
which had not been repealed, he forbade the hoarding “of gold or silver coin or bullion
or currency,” under penalty of $10,000 fine or ten years’ imprisonment or both.
Id.; see also Hoarding of Gold, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1933, at 16.
60. Gold Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 73-87, 48 Stat. 337 (1934).
61. Jewelry ownership was still allowed. See KWASI KWARTENG, WAR AND GOLD: A FIVEHUNDRED-YEAR HISTORY OF EMPIRES, ADVENTURES AND DEBT 131 (2014).
62. Id.
63. ELWELL, supra note 39, at 11.
64. See Margaret Garritsen de Vries, The Bretton Woods Conference and the Birth of the International
Monetary Fund, in THE BRETTON WOODS-GATT SYSTEM: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT AFTER FIFTY
YEARS 3, 3 (Orin Kirshner ed., 1996).
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to call Bretton Woods “the most successful economic conference ever held.”65
At Bretton Woods, forty-five participating nations negotiated an agreement to
establish a new exchange rate and an international payments policy.66 The system
was meant to deter some of the economic causes of the Great Depression, forcing
participating nations to surrender a degree of their monetary sovereignty.67 This
willful surrender was likely motivated by a global desire to access IMF resources
and U.S. monetary support for reconstruction in a postwar world.68
The newly-established exchange rate was a pegged—or fixed—exchange rate.69
This meant that the forty-five nations would determine the value of their respective
currencies based on an agreed-upon and specified rate.70 John Maynard Keynes—
who, along with Harry Dexter White,71 spearheaded the economic policies behind
Bretton Woods—proposed the creation of a new international reserve currency,
which he called the “bancor.”72 This was, in a way, another revival of Scaruffi’s
earlier moneta immaginaria: it was similar to a conceptual world money system and
existed merely as a money-of-account. But the U.S. delegation avoided further
discussion of the “bancor” at Bretton Woods in the hopes that the U.S. dollar would
become the new reserve currency,73 thus increasing the stature of the alreadypowerful dollar and American economy.
Ultimately, the agreed-upon Bretton Woods system imposed some important
obligations on its members: Article III required members to pay their quota—25%
of which was to be in gold74—to the IMF; Article IV required members to keep their
exchange rate within a 1% bandwidth around par values; and Article VIII forbade
restrictions on current payments without the consent of the IMF.75 All these
65. Id.
66. Peter Kugler, The Bretton Woods System: Design and Operation, in MONEY IN THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION: MIDDLE AGES TO BRETTON WOODS 611, 611 (David Fox & Wolfgang Ernst eds., 2016);
see also Kurt Schuler & Mark Bernkopf, Who Was at Bretton Woods?, (Cent. for Fin. Stability, Paper in
Financial History, 2014) (providing a complete list of attendees).
67. Kugler, supra note 66, at 611–12.
68. Id. at 612.
69. L. Randall Wray, Introduction: The Continuing Legacy of John Maynard Keynes, in KEYNES FOR
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF THE GENERAL THEORY 1, 10 (Mathew
Forstater & L. Randall Wray eds., 2008).
70. See generally E. F. Schumacher, Multilateral Clearing, 10 ECONOMICA 150 (1943).
71. White was later accused of being a Soviet spy. See generally R. BRUCE CRAIG, TREASONABLE
DOUBT: THE HARRY DEXTER WHITE SPY CASE (2004).
72. HENDRIK VAN DEN BERG, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: A HETERODOX APPROACH 473 (3d ed.
2017).
73. Id. at 434. Others note that the structure of the U.S. federal government implicitly allows
ambitious officials to discuss creative ideas in an international forum, but it limits the implementation of
those ideas because they are “obliged to run the gauntlet created by an elaborate system of checks and
balances inside the U.S. political structure; and in the process, any measures that would seem to tie the hands
of the Congress or the courts have usually been cut back or abandoned.” Raymond Vernon, The U.S.
Government at Bretton Woods and After, in THE BRETTON WOODS-GATT SYSTEM: RETROSPECT AND
PROSPECT AFTER FIFTY YEARS 52, 52–53 (Orin Kirshner ed., 1996). Perhaps the avoidance of discussing
the “bancor” further was founded on the understanding that the chances of congressional approval were
minimal.
74. This began the IMF’s acquisition of gold. In March 2011, it held around 90.5 million ounces of
gold (valued at about $4.4 billion). Catherine R. Schenk, The Global Gold Market and the International
Monetary System, in THE GLOBAL GOLD MARKET AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM FROM THE
LATE 19TH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT: ACTORS, NETWORK, POWER 17, 27 (Sandra Bott ed., 2013).
75. Kugler, supra note 66, at 618–19.
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obligations intended to avoid protectionism, currency wars, and unstable exchange
rates—each of which were suspected contributors to the Great Depression.76
Most importantly for the U.S., Bretton Woods implicitly fixed the pegged
exchange rate to the American dollar. Unfortunately for the American citizen, this
allowed foreign central bankers to do what the American citizen could do no longer:
the privilege of convertibility was granted to the foreign banker, allowing for the
exchange of excess dollars for gold at any time.77 This attribute would later serve
as one of the primary reasons for the demise of the system under American
leadership. But, viewing these attributes as beneficial, Congress passed the Bretton
Woods Agreements Act in July 1945,78 and the U.S. officially entered the IMF five
months later.
C. The Nixon Shock
And so, the framework of an international monetary order existed, but due to
several obstacles, it took nearly fifteen years for the Bretton Woods system to
operate.79 Once fully operational in 1958, however, the system prevailed with the
U.S. dollar as the world’s reserve currency until 1971.80 And the system was
extremely successful: even today, Bretton Woods is “associated with higher and
more stable economic growth than in any other period in the past 150 years with the
exception of the Great Moderation from 1983 to 2006.”81
But several factors would lead to Bretton Woods’ demise, two of the most
important of which were the rise of inflation in the U.S. and the threat of foreign
convertibility.82 Inflation began in the late 1960s due to the financing of the Vietnam
War and the funding of President Johnson’s Great Society.83 This extreme
inflation—an average of 8.8%—began after a decade of price stability, with only
minimal inflation at an annual rate of 1% or 2%.84 The threat of convertibility
loomed large. If foreign central bankers were determined to liquidate their dollars,
U.S. gold sources could be entirely depleted. This would leave nothing to back
currency. The U.S. Treasury urged the State Department to attempt to develop
diplomatic policies meant to deter this behavior, such as the constant threat to pull
out U.S. troops from much-needed areas in Soviet-dominated Europe.85
On August 15, 1971, after a meeting with his economic advisers at Camp David,
76. Michael D. Bordo, The Operation and Demise of the Bretton Woods System 1 (Hoover Inst., Econ.,
Working Paper No. 16116, 2017).
77. FRANCIS J. GAVIN, GOLD, DOLLARS, & POWER: THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
RELATIONS, 1958–1971 23 (2004).
78. Bretton Woods Agreements Act, ch. 339, 59 Stat. 512 (1945).
79. Obstacles to operation included bilateral issues and a shortage of the U.S. dollar. Bordo, supra
note 76, at 6.
80. Id. at 11.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 21, 23.
83. See RONALD I. MCKINNON, THE UNLOVED DOLLAR STANDARD: FROM BRETTON WOODS TO THE
RISE OF CHINA 50 (2013). The Federal Reserve’s policies were also responsible for this inflation and
ineffectively used to combat it. As Milton Friedman said, “[N]o major institution in the United States has so
poor a record of performance over so long a period yet so high a public reputation as the Federal Reserve.”
MILTON FRIEDMAN, THE ESSENCE OF FRIEDMAN 405 (Kurt R. Leube ed., 1987).
84. YANEK MIECZKOWSKI, GERALD FORD AND THE CHALLENGES OF THE 1970S 99 (2005).
85. Bordo, supra note 76, at 18.
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President Nixon announced a ninety-day freeze on wages, prices, rents, and
dividends; eliminated foreign convertibility; and ultimately removed the U.S. from
the gold standard.86 This would later be called the “Nixon Shock.”87 Nixon intended
the announcement to be temporary; he meant it to be a negotiation tool to pressure
other nations into revaluing their own currencies.88 But after several failed
negotiations and new economic policies, Congress officially removed the definition
of the dollar in terms of gold from the statute.89 The U.S. dollar had become, once
again, a fiat currency.90 And it remains one today.
In removing the gold standard, the U.S. arguably violated the Articles of
Agreement of the IMF.91 Regardless, all attempts to revive a fixed exchange rate
failed, and by March 1973, major currencies dangerously floated against each other.
92
Because of this change in American economic policy, Bretton Woods collapsed.

II. SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS
A frequent source of speculation among IMF observers, Special Drawing Rights
(SDRs) have been both lauded as potential economic saviors and disregarded as
entirely insignificant to individual nations and the international monetary order.93
The truth may be somewhere in between, but any exploration of the future of
SDRs—especially in the sphere of the cryptocurrency—requires a discussion of
their basic functions,94 as well as their principal uses.95
A. The basic functions
Before the Nixon Shock, but in recognition of the inadequacies of both gold and
the U.S. dollar as reserve assets, the international community decided to create a
86. Exec. Order No. 11615, 36 C.F.R. 15727 (1971); THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: A HISTORICAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA 303 (Cynthia Clark Northrup ed., 2003); RICHARD H.K. VIETOR, HOW COUNTRIES
COMPETE: STRATEGY, STRUCTURE, AND GOVERNMENT IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 222 (2007).
87. Exec. Order No. 11615, 36 C.F.R. 15727 (1971); THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: A HISTORICAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 86, at 303; VIETOR, supra note 86, at 222.
88. ELWELL, supra note 39, at 13.
89. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-564, 90 Stat. 2660 (1976).
90. Notably, private gold ownership was allowed once again in the U.S. under President Ford. Act of
Aug. 14, 1974, Pub. L. 93-373, 88 Stat. 445 (1974). The price of gold then skyrocketed in the 1970s, surging
2,300% over nine years. SHAYNE MCGUIRE, HARD MONEY: TAKING GOLD TO A HIGHER INVESTMENT
LEVEL 74 (2010).
91. Detlev F. Vagts, Editorial Comment, The Financial Meltdown and Its International Implications,
103 AM. J. INT’L L. 684, 684 (2009).
92. See Peter M. Garber, The Collapse of the Bretton Woods Fixed Exchange Rate System, in A
RETROSPECTIVE ON THE BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM: LESSONS FOR INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM
461, 468 (Michael D. Bordo & Barry Eichengreen eds., 1993) (“The realignments under the Smithsonian
Agreements did not end the selling attacks—the massive acquisitions of official dollar claims did not cease
until generalized floating began in March 1973.”).
93. E.g., Ian Talley & David Gauthier-Villars, Special IMF Money Considered, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 4,
2011),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203804204577016554222191164
[https://perma.cc/L62U-5LK5]; e.g., Annie Lowrey, So, what is a Special Drawing Right, anyway?, FOREIGN
POLICY: PASSPORT (Apr. 2, 2009, 11:02 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/04/02/so-what-is-a-specialdrawing-right-anyway/ [https://perma.cc/589V-FXR9].
94. See infra Part II.A.
95. See infra Part II.B.
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new reserve asset, called Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), under the IMF.96 At the
1967 annual meeting in Rio de Janeiro, the IMF conceived SDRs, intending them
“to meet the need, as and when it arises, for a supplement to [gold and the U.S.
dollar].”97 The creators envisioned SDRs serving as a basic reform to correct Bretton
Woods’ increasingly-clear “failure to anticipate the enormous increase in capital
mobility that . . . occurred.”98 To accomplish this, SDRs functioned as a reserve
asset less dependent on American economic success and policy.99 Governed by
Article XXI of the Articles of Agreement,100 the value of one SDR was set to be
equivalent to 0.888671 grams of fine gold, which was also the precise
contemporaneous value of one U.S. dollar,101 as the quasi-gold standard still held.
But again, in the spirit of Scaruffi’s moneta immaginaria and Keynes’ “bancor,”
SDRs were merely money-of-account.102
Called “paper gold” by some,103 SDRs were meant to increase global liquidity.104
Immediately, commentators expected them to take on a prominent role in the
international monetary order. Internal CIA documents from 1970 indicate the
agency estimated that SDRs would account for about 10% of total global liquidity
within two years and could account for nearly 25% of total global liquidity within
ten years.105
But the new asset was not successful. Some attribute the shortcomings to the
“restricted usability” of SDRs.106 Others see their failure as coinciding with a lessfavorable shift in international attitudes toward world money.107 Ultimately, the
SDR gold valuation became entirely meaningless because convertibility was not an
option.108
So, in 1974, the IMF changed SDRs’ valuation and instead determined their
value daily, based upon a basket of currencies.109 Sixteen different currencies—
96. CHRISTOPHER M.D. WILKIE, SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS: THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL MONEY 1
(2012). Much of this concern originated with a popular book that warned of a great reduction in international
confidence in the U.S. dollar as a reserve asset. See ROBERT TRIFFIN, GOLD AND THE DOLLAR CRISIS: THE
FUTURE OF CONVERTIBILITY 138 (1961).
97. IMF, Establishment of a Facility Based on Special Drawing Rights in the International Monetary
Fund and Modifications in the Rules and Practices of the Fund, Annual Report 1968 (Apr. 1968).
98. Robert Solomon, The History of the SDR, in THE FUTURE OF THE SDR IN LIGHT OF CHANGES IN
THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 25, 25 (Michael Mussa et al. eds., 1996).
99. Andrew Crockett & Morris Goldstein, Strengthening the International Monetary System 52 (IMF,
Occasional Paper No. 50, 1987).
100. Articles of Agreement of the IMF, Art. XXI, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 (adopted July 22, 1944)
(amended 2016).
101. JAMES M. BOUGHTON, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 1979–
1989 950 (2001).
102. See Stability in a Multiple Reserve-Asset System, in THE FUTURE OF THE SDR IN LIGHT OF
CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 122, 158 (Michael Mussa et al. eds., 1996).
103. E.g., I.M.F. Vote Backs ‘Paper Gold’ Plan, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1968, at 61.
104. WILKIE, supra note 96, at 35.
105. Memorandum from Directorate of Intelligence on Special Drawing Rights (Sept. 1970)
(declassified Oct. 31, 2011) (on file with the CIA Library).
106. Crocket & Goldstein, supra note 99, at 53. Countries are restricted in the use of their SDRs to
pay their deficits. SUBRATA GHATAK & JOSÉ R. SÁNCHEZ-FUNG, MONETARY ECONOMICS IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 241 (3d ed. 2007).
107. WILKIE, supra note 96, at 35.
108. BOUGHTON, supra note 101.
109. IMF, International Financial Statistics (Jan. 2015).
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including the U.S. dollar, Deutsche mark, Swedish krona, Japanese yen, and South
African rand—initially composed this basket.110 These currencies were chosen
because they accounted for at least 1% of world trade from 1968 until 1972.111 The
IMF decided to review the method of this valuation every five years.112 The current
composition of the SDR is as follows: U.S. dollar (41.73%); Euro (30.93%); Chinese
renminbi (10.92%); Japanese yen (8.33%); and Pound sterling (8.09%).113
B. Past uses
The IMF is authorized to allocate SDRs to its members in proportion to their
IMF quotas.114 General allocations are determined by the IMF Board of Governors
for periods of up to five years.115 But it is notable that general allocations have
happened only three times, and each was related to a crisis of confidence in the U.S.
dollar.
1. Early 1970s
The first allocation of SDRs took place shortly after their creation. In 1969, the
IMF approved the allocation of SDR 9.5 billion over a three-year period.116 The
IMF intended this allocation to curb the excessive international reliance on the very
unreliable U.S. dollar—the original purpose of the SDR.117 But almost immediately
after the Nixon Shock occurred, the quasi-gold standard was eliminated, and floating
exchange rates dominated the international monetary order.118
2. 1979
Still struggling from the economic policies of an earlier decade, the U.S.
experienced inflation to the tune of 9.5% in October 1979.119 Domestic interest rates
rose steeply.120 The IMF—already broken from the gold standard and adopting the
110. IMF, Activities of the Fund, Annual Report 1974, at 51 (Sept. 1974).
111. GEORGE D. HOLLIDAY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., OPEC’S PROPOSAL TO PEG THE PRICE OF OIL
EXPORTS TO SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS 2 (1977).
112. See IMF, Making the Global Economy Work for All, Annual Report 2002 (2002).
113. Press Release, International Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Completes the 2015 Review
of SDR Valuation (Dec. 1, 2015). The daily value is posted on the IMF’s website. SDR Valuation, IMF,
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/data/rms_sdrv.aspx [https://perma.cc/T7UZ-NF5Z] (last visited Nov. 17,
2017).
114. Articles of Agreement of the IMF, Art. XV, § 1, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 (adopted July 22,
1944) (amended 2016) (“To meet the need, as and when it arises, for a supplement to existing reserve assets,
the Fund is authorized to allocate special drawing rights in accordance with the provisions of Article XVIII
to members that are participants in the Special Drawing Rights Department.”); Articles of Agreement of the
IMF, Art. XVIII, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 (adopted July 22, 1944) (amended 2016).
115. The last general allocation was made in 2016. IMF, The Case for a General Allocation of SDRs
During the Eleventh Basic Period, SDR Allocation (May 2016).
116. Montek Singh Ahluwalia, SDR Allocations and the Present Articles of Agreement, in THE
FUTURE OF THE SDR IN LIGHT OF CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 88, 90 (Michael
Mussa et al. eds., 1996).
117. See id. at 91.
118. See id.
119. Marvin Goodfriend & Robert G. King, The Great Inflation Drift, in THE GREAT INFLATION: THE
REBIRTH OF MODERN CENTRAL BANKING 181, 200 (Michael D. Bordo & Athanasios Orphanides eds.,
2013).
120. October 6, 1979 (Fed. Res. Bank of San Francisco, Economic Letter No. 2004-35, 2004).
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currency basket model—allocated SDR 12 billion over a three-year period.121 This
allocation was significant: The volume of transactions in SDRs rose, and the
acceptability of the SDR as a reserve asset grew.122 And so, by 1990, 80% of SDRs
were held by IMF members.123
3. 2009
But the use and prominence of the SDR decreased as the value and stability of
the U.S. dollar increased. In 2009, however, in response to the beginnings of the
Great Recession, the IMF again issued another SDR allocation: a special one-time
allocation of SDR 21.5 billion,124 more than had ever been allocated in the past. The
2009 allocation was even encouraged by the U.S. Treasury.125 And with the SDR’s
apparent reemergence as a valuable world asset, China and other emerging
economies pounced, calling for a decreased role in the value of the U.S. dollar.126
The IMF eventually seemed to concede, and Chinese currency is now included in
the SDR’s basket.127
III. SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS AS A CRYPTOCURRENCY
Christine Lagarde,128 Managing Director of the IMF, noted in September of 2017
that the SDR may have a future as a cryptocurrency:
[H]ow will [cryptocurrencies] change central banking over the next
generation? That is the focus of my remarks today. . . . [C]itizens may one
day prefer virtual currencies, since they potentially offer the same cost and
convenience as cash—no settlement risks, no clearing delays, no central
registration, no intermediary to check accounts and identities. If privately
issued virtual currencies remain risky and unstable, citizens may even call
on central banks to provide digital forms of legal tender. . . . The remit of
central banks will grow, and with it, perhaps, public scrutiny and political
pressures. Independence—at least to set monetary policy—will need further
defenses and require even clearer communication. . . . I am convinced that
the IMF has a strong role to play in this respect. But the Fund will also have

121. Ahluwalia, supra note 116, at 92–93.
122. BOUGHTON, supra note 101, at 928. Acceptability of the SDR as a global asset is largely
attributed to an amendment to the Articles in the 1980s that allowed transactions of the SDR to occur without
prior approval of the IMF. Id. at 933.
123. BOUGHTON, supra note 101, at 928.
124. Press Release, International Monetary Fund, IMF Governors Formally Approve US$250 Billion
General SDR Allocation (Aug. 13, 2009).
125. Heidi N. Moore, Geithner: Down With the Dollar, Up With the . . . SDR?, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 25,
2009),
https://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2009/03/25/geithner-down-with-the-dollar-up-with-thesdr/
[https://perma.cc/B76K-KEDH].
126. Andrew Batson, China Takes Aim at Dollar, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 24, 2009),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123780272456212885 [https://perma.cc/N4H6-X8SH].
127. Press Release, supra note 13.
128 It is worth noting that Lagarde is a controversial figure and has encountered legal troubles in the past.
E.g., Tyler Durden, The DSKing Of Christine Lagarde: Someone Wants to Eliminate the Head of the IMF,
ZEROHEDGE (Dec. 17, 2015, 3:15 PM), http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-12-17/dsking-christinelagarde-someone-wants-eliminate-head-imf [https://perma.cc/PSS4-DACJ].
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to be open to change, from bringing new parties to the table, to considering
a role for a digital version of the SDR.129
The seemingly-small world of cryptocurrency academics, traders, and
enthusiasts all responded excitedly.130 And speculation abounded. But through all
the excitement, two possibilities for a cryptocurrency-incorporation within the
framework of the SDR emerge: (1) the total redefinition of the SDR as its own
unique cryptocurrency; and (2) the inclusion of a specific cryptocurrency in the
SDR’s basket of currencies.
A. Redefining the SDR entirely as a unique cryptocurrency
A unique cryptocurrency would essentially be akin to a fiat currency. This
cryptocurrency—which James Mackintosh refers to as “IMFCoin”131—would be in
the spirit of Scaruffi’s moneta immaginaria and Keynes’ “bancor.” It would truly
be a mere money-of-account because its tracking and establishment would exist only
on the blockchain, which is essentially a digital ledger.132
Mackintosh posits that the “IMFCoin” would bring the SDR back into
prominence and supplant the U.S. dollar as the primary currency of world trade.133
He asserts that the use of the “IMFCoin” would “speed global growth,”134 and that
the IMF would have more power as a central bank to issue currency to meet the
needs of the international monetary system.135
But the “IMFCoin”—at least as it would exist in this scenario—would run
counter to the entire concept that has driven the success of modern commercial
cryptocurrencies. Where Bitcoin and others seek to flee the control of the central
bank and bankers’ whisks and whims, “IMFCoin” would be controlled by one of the
most nefarious and criticized international organizations.136 And relatedly, its
value—arbitrarily set by the central bank and bankers—would be backed by public
and international trust in the organization that is the IMF. But the IMF’s track record
on that front is not stellar.137
B. Including a specific cryptocurrency in the SDR’s basket
A potentially more plausible alternative to a complete redefinition of the SDR
as a cryptocurrency is the inclusion of a specific cryptocurrency in the basket of
currencies which constitute the SDR. The review of which currencies constitute the
129. Lagarde, supra note 15.
130. E.g., Samburaj Das, IMF’s Lagarde Warns Bank: Cryptocurrencies Will Bring “Massive
Disruptions”, CRYPTOCOINSNEWS.COM (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/imfs-lagardewarns-banks-cryptocurrencies-will-bring-massive-disruptions/ [https://perma.cc/4LWZ-GM4G].
131. Mackintosh, supra note 16.
132. See generally DON TAPSCOTT & ALEX TAPSCOTT, BLOCKCHAIN REVOLUTION: HOW THE
TECHNOLOGY BEHIND BITCOIN IS CHANGING MONEY, BUSINESS, AND THE WORLD (2016).
133. Mackintosh, supra note 16.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See generally EDWIN M. TRUMAN, A STRATEGY FOR IMF REFORM (2006).
137. See, e.g., Ana Eiras, IMF and World Bank Intervention: A Problem, Not a Solution, HERITAGE
FOUND. (Sept. 17, 2003), http://www.heritage.org/monetary-policy/report/imf-and-world-bank-interventionproblem-not-solution [https://perma.cc/6E4V-SXQW].
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basket occurred most recently in 2015,138 and the next review will happen in 2021.139
If, in 2021, the IMF were to embrace a specific cryptocurrency, then it would expand
the basket from the current five currencies to six currencies and redistribute their
values accordingly. The question then becomes: which cryptocurrency does the IMF
choose?
Historically, the IMF has looked to include currencies that constitute a
significant part of world trade.140 In 2016, world merchandise exports were valued
at $15.46 trillion, and exports of world commercial services were valued at $4.77
trillion,141 totaling $20.23 trillion. Perhaps the IMF would naturally be drawn to the
most valuable cryptocurrency, which—at the moment—happens to be the popular
Bitcoin. Bitcoin reached a market capitalization in December 2017 at nearly $350
billion,142 or approximately 2.2% of world trade value.143 But for the real insight,
the IMF may need to look to Bitcoin’s transaction volume, which in December 2017
was approximately $3.6 billion per day,144 which, if that daily transaction value held
year-round, equals approximately 6.2% of world trade value.145
These two statistics, however, will undoubtedly change by the IMF’s next
review in 2021. And if the current trajectory holds, then Bitcoin’s position will be
favorable. Dennis A. Porto, a Harvard academic, believed in 2017 that Bitcoin’s
price could be over $100,000 per coin by then.146 And more retailers—like
Overstock.com—are beginning to accept Bitcoin payments.147 If this trend
continued, then Bitcoin’s daily transaction value would greatly increase.
But the trajectory is unlikely to hold. There are several reasons for this. First,
Bitcoin is famously volatile. Some have already warned that its volatility makes its
actual use as a currency impossible.148 Second, other cryptocurrencies like
Ethereum and Ripple may surpass Bitcoin in value and public trust.149 Finally,
138. Press Release, supra note 113.
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., HOLLIDAY, supra note 111.
141. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, WORLD TRADE STATISTICAL REVIEW 2017 19 (2017),
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/wts2017_e/WTO_Chapter_03_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/62683DCN].
142. Bitcoin, COINMARKETCAP (Dec. 7, 2017), https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/bitcoin/
[https://perma.cc/3J48-5V6N].
143. This is calculated in terms of 2016 world trade value.
144. Bitcoin
Estimated
Transaction
Volume
USD,
QUANDL
(Dec.
7,
2017),
https://www.quandl.com/data/BCHAIN/ETRVU-Bitcoin-Estimated-Transaction-Volume-USD
[https://perma.cc/2D4C-629P].
145. Again, this is calculated in terms of 2016 world trade value.
146. Interview by Frank Chaparro with Dennis A. Porto (Aug. 7, 2017),
http://uk.businessinsider.com/bitcoin-price-and-moores-law-2017-8?r=US&IR=T [https://perma.cc/5N6WSSN9].
147. Cade Metz, Overstock.com Becomes First Major Retailer to Accept Bitcoin Worldwide, WIRED
(Sept. 11, 2014), https://www.wired.com/2014/09/overstock-com-becomes-first-major-retailer-acceptbitcoin-worldwide/ [https://perma.cc/HMD6-MVYG]; The Bitcoin Foundation, #Bitcoin2014–Keynote
Address, “500 Years of Liberalism” by Dr. Patrick Byrne, CEO of Overstock.com, YOUTUBE (May 20,
2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l--zHVO3Cik [https://perma.cc/VW7Z-4H4J].
148. E.g., Neil Gandal & Hanna Halaburda, Competition in the Cryptocurrency Market 10 (Bank of
Canada, Working Paper No. 2014-33, 2014).
149. E.g., Laignee Barron, 5 Bitcoin Rivals That Are Rapidly on the Rise, FORTUNE (Dec. 4, 2017),
http://fortune.com/2017/12/04/bitcoin-ethereum-cryptocurrency-blockchain/
[https://perma.cc/5568RM9C].
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governments will likely step-in to organize regulatory frameworks to combat some
of the more illicit uses for Bitcoin and benefit from taxation policies. This has
already happened in states like New York with its BitLicense.150 This would greatly
decrease the currency’s popularity and value and ultimately decrease its use.
All of this leads to the conclusion that any incorporation of a specific
cryptocurrency within the SDR framework would require several years of that
cryptocurrency’s steadiness in value, increased use, and government acceptance.
Even Bitcoin, as the most popular cryptocurrency, is years from this status.
CONCLUSION
American monetary policy is not perfect. And clearly, its past is troubled and
tumultuous. Within the nation’s short life, the U.S. dollar has gone from a bimetallic
currency, to a fiat currency, to a gold standard, to a quasi-gold standard, and then
back to a fiat currency. And nothing really stops the U.S. from changing its standard
once again. In fact, as recently as the 2016 presidential election, Senator Ted Cruz
advocated for a return to the gold standard.151
But the international monetary order is inherently tied to American monetary
policy. And while this was initially caused by American military dominance during
World War II, its continuation is due to American economic dominance in the
postwar world.
Cryptocurrencies are a new and exciting way for individuals to invest in a
democratized and decentralized currency. But advocating for an IMF adoption of
cryptocurrencies within the framework of the SDR—through either a new and
unique cryptocurrency or the incorporation of an existing cryptocurrency in the
SDR’s basket—is, at best, foolish because of cryptocurrencies’ volatility and
deregulated status, and at worst, an anti-American sentiment encouraged by
dangerous and anti-democratic regimes. Scaruffi’s moneta immaginaria will have
to wait.

150. N.Y.
COMP.
CODES
R.
&
REGS.
tit.
23,
§
200
(2016),
https://govt.westlaw.com/nycrr/Browse/Home/NewYork/NewYorkCodesRulesandRegulations?guid=I7444
ce80169611e594630000845b8d3e&originationContext=documenttoc&transitionType=Default&contextDat
a=(sc.Default) [https://perma.cc/N888-HN7E].
151. See Matt O’Brien, This Might Be Ted Cruz’s Worst Idea, WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/02/23/this-might-be-ted-cruzs-worstidea/?utm_term=.f6554731fa57 [https://perma.cc/X38T-62C7].

